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In January 2019, the European Union (EU) and 48 other members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) decided to start negotiations to put in place global
rules on electronic commerce. On 20 May, the European Council adopted a nego-
tiating mandate, which explicitly stressed ‘the European Union and its Member
States shall maintain the possibility to preserve and develop their capacity to define
and implement cultural and audiovisual policies for the purposes of preserving
their cultural diversity. The European Union shall not agree to rules or commit-
ments for audiovisual services’ (Council of the European Union, 2019: 4).
Indeed, the treatment of audiovisual goods and services in bilateral and multi-
lateral trade agreements has proved one of the most controversial issues in the
European governance and EU external relations. Audiovisual goods and services,
oscillated between symbolic and material spheres, raise major issues for several
involved actors: economic issues because audiovisual industries are a key sector in
terms of growth and employment for the national economies; political issues, given
that audiovisual goods and services – seen as vehicles of collective ideas, values and
representations – are resources of the power of States and of their capacity to
shape their international environment; finally, identity issues because cultural
expressions – distributed by audiovisual industries – are usually components of
national, regional or local identities and several actors are increasingly worried on
cultural dominance (Thorsby, 2010). It is revealing that according to the UNESCO
Institute for Statistics (2016: 11), audiovisual services are increasingly becoming
the most important cultural service traded. At the same time, cinema is the sector
in which most of the export and import measures are put in place (Deloumeaux,
2018: 136).
In this view, the global audiovisual politics and economy are a strategic and
relevant site for analysing the international cultural influence of EU and for under-
standing how audiovisual sector could allow EU to build a status of international
powerful actor in global cultural politics. The urgency of this topic is linked to a
recent transforming evolution: the arrival of large online platforms, which repre-
sent an unprecedented change in production, distribution, broadcasting, consump-
tion of audiovisual content (Nieborg and Poell, 2018; Vlassis et al., 2020). ‘The
presence of these intermediaries in the everyday lives of citizens and consumers is
raising major policy issues’ (Mansell, 2015: 21). Thus, innovative over-the-top
(OTT) video services, such as Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, Disneyþ, Apple
TVþ or HBO Max are expected to have major impact on the balance of power
in the global audiovisual economy (Lobato, 2018), insofar as ‘platformisation
entails the rise of the platform as dominant infrastructural and/or economic
model in the industry’ (Evens and Donders, 2018: 4).
An academic research recently offers relevant insights on the EU action in the
international cultural–audiovisual affairs. It deals with key issues: the regulation of
the ‘trade and culture’ interface and the EU’s role (Psychogiopoulou, 2014;
Richieri-Hanania, 2019), the EU role in the implementation of the Convention
on diversity of cultural expressions (Pauwels and Loisen, 2016), the interregional
cooperation related to the audiovisual sector with special focus on the links
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between EU and Mercosur (Canedo and Crusafon, 2014; Sarikakis and Ganter,
2014). The growing body of research seeks to understand the overall action of the
EU in international cultural affairs. However, based on a legal–institutionalist
approach, it seems to overestimate the evolving EU’s influence and impact in
global cultural politics and economy. In other terms, the argument here is that
this research object is multidimensional and it is necessary to highlight multiple
variables beyond the policy results of EU institutions.
The article that follows is analytical and its research purpose is twofold: first, to
consider whether and how EU has a strong influence in global cultural politics and
economy – taking as case study the audiovisual and film sector – and second,
to analyse whether the United States keeps playing a key role in global
audiovisual content flows or its dominance is challenged by the EU or other
countries – such as China or India. And the two research purposes are analysed
in the light of the rise of global online platforms, seen as the new dominant devel-
opment in the audiovisual industry. In fact, in its contested position between
national and supranational interests, the study of EU in global audiovisual politics
and economy can be seen to mirror central debate related to future of European
project, ‘namely to negotiate and reconcile the desires of cultural specificity and
national identity with the larger ideal of supranational community’ (Bergfelder,
2005: 315).
In order to analyse the two research purposes mentioned above, the article is
structured on three interlinked factors (Galperin, 1999) of the EU audiovisual
policy and economy:
(i) European/internal audiovisual policies;
(ii) market profile;
(iii) foreign audiovisual diplomacy.
The first factor concerns the domestic regulatory framework for audiovisual
industries within the EU. The second one refers to the distribution of economic
resources among the trading partners’ audiovisual industries. The third one deals
with the ability of EU to promote European audiovisual content in the global
marketplace and to disseminate European standards related to audiovisual
sector at a global scale. Besides, the quantitative comparative data presented in
the article are notably with respect to film industry in EU, US, China and India
(film production, market share, box-office revenues).1 In this view, the article seeks
to offer a multi-dimensional analysis for understanding the EU influence in global
audiovisual politics and economy, paying special attention to the arrival of global
online platforms.
To address the two research purposes, the article primarily discusses the key
norms, which have dominated the global politics for audiovisual goods and serv-
ices since the 1990s, highlighting specifically the link between international eco-
nomic integration and audiovisual sector. It emphasises, furthermore, the
evolution of the relationship between EU institutions and audiovisual industry,
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as well as on the development of EU film market since the 1990s. It also aims to
draw up an inventory of EU’s role within the global audiovisual politics. In the
end, the article examines the competition that EU faces in the global audiovisual
economy, focusing notably on the US/Hollywood, China and India.
Global politics for audiovisual goods and services: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly
Since early 1990s, the elimination of regulatory and financial measures in the
audiovisual sector has been a major priority of US trade diplomacy as well as a
stumbling block in the process of the international and regional economic integra-
tion (Vlassis, 2015). National government policies in support of their film indus-
tries rely on two types of measures: those that attempt to restrict entry of
foreign competitors, such as tariffs and quotas, and those that provide preferential
treatment to the domestic industry in the form of subsidies and tax credits (Crane,
2014: 8). ‘The USA stands as the major exponent of a competition approach to
the production and supply of media content’ (Gibbons and Humphreys, 2012: 18).
The goal of the US administration, followed mainly by several powerful industrial
associations such as Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA, 2017), was
to incorporate cultural and audiovisual goods and services within the agenda
of international trade negotiations. The most prominent examples are the last
period of negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
of the WTO in 1993, the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between US, Canada and Mexico in 1994. As Miller and Yudice (2002: 174) noted,
‘The US motivation was obvious: replacing national societies of culture with a
global society of alleged efficiency’. Meanwhile, since 2001 (the Doha Round) and
the institutional crisis of multilateral model of the WTO, the US administration
has also opted for the plurilateral and bilateral pathway, concluding free trade
agreements (FTAs) with economically developed and developing countries2
and seeking to promote liberalisation of audiovisual markets as key norm
(Gagne, 2016).
The US position, based on ‘free trade’ norm, was largely associated with the
Washington consensus, which has gained ascension since the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the bipolar world order. The consensus asserts that global
welfare would be maximised by the liberalisation of trade, finance and investment,
and by restructuring national economies to provide an enabling environment for
capital. In this regard, the assumption entails that audiovisual policies should
follow an underlying principle that ‘human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade’ (Harvey, 2005: 2).
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At the same time, rapid financial globalisation, international and regional eco-
nomic integration and liberalisation of trade exchanges raised major concerns over
the implications on cultural identities, cultural sovereignty and survival of national
cultural industries. As such, a coalition of actors, driven by France and Canada
and several organizations of cultural professionals, promoted the ‘cultural excep-
tion’ (exception culturelle) norm in order to exclude cultural and audiovisual goods
and services from the agenda of trade negotiations. ‘Cultural exception’ norm
focuses on specificity of cultural goods and services – which are not considered
as simply commercial commodities bought and sold on markets –, as well as on
legitimacy of public intervention in cultural and audio-visual sectors (Buchsbaum,
2017; Vlassis, 2015). Small wonder, then, that the Convention on the Protection
and the Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (hereafter CDCE) –
adopted by UNESCO in 2005 – was seen as a response to the threat towards
cultural policies coming from international and regional economic integration
(Graber, 2006). As of February 2020, the CDCE has received the support of
148 member-states and of EU. The CDCE recognises the specificity of cultural
goods and services and the importance of cultural policies for the protection and
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions. It also incorporates concrete
provisions to the link culture and sustainable development, aiming to strengthen
international cultural cooperation through various tools, such as expert and infor-
mation exchange among the Parties, preferential treatment for developing coun-
tries and the setting up of the International Fund for Cultural Diversity.
In addition, the new context of platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2017) intensifies
this normative confrontation, insofar as US online plarforms have been emerged
as a powerful technological players in global audiovisual economy since 2010s. In
this regard, one of the key diplomacy priorities of the Obama administration was
to include digital cultural services in the agenda of megaregional partnerships,
such as Trans-pacific partnership (TPP) between 12 countries along the Pacific
Rim3 singed in 2016, the negotiations on Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP) between EU and US and on Trade in Services Agreement
(TiSA). Indeed, the US priority was to treat online cultural services, such as
video-on-demand (VOD) services into a single chapter devoted to e-commerce,
to promote an open market environment and to eliminate all forms of discrim-
ination with regard to digital cultural and audiovisual content (Guevremont,
2015: 142). For its part, Trump administration withdrew the United States
from the TPP in 2017 and the negotiations on TiSA and T-TIP are in hiberna-
tion mode. Today, the US trade diplomacy puts in place a new transactional
approach, which establishes an extremely unpredictable context in international
economic relations. In this view, the multilateral regulation of digital cultural and
audiovisual services is expected to be tested within two current negotiations:
the trade negotiations between US and China dealing with several
technological sectors and the WTO ongoing negotiations on electronic commerce
(Vlassis, 2018).
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EU audiovisual policies and Janus-faced syndrome: Un long
dimanche des fiançailles
First, regarding the factor of regulatory framework, the EU audiovisual landscape
has experienced ‘a period of continuous change from the 1980s onwards’ associ-
ated with changes in audiovisual policy and ‘a series of technological develop-
ments, which have, either directly or indirectly, had an influence on policy
choices’ towards the audiovisual sector (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011:
1). Several EU policy tools have been designed for going hand in hand with the
economic transformations of the audiovisual sector and for giving Europe’s
response to challenges of digitisation, globalisation and commercialisation
(d’Haenens, Sousa and Trappel, 2018).
The Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWFD), based on the logic of the
‘mandatory liberalization, optional interventionism’ (Littoz-Monnet, 2007: 84)
was issued in 1989, amended in 1997 and replaced by the Audiovisual Media
Services Directive (AVMSD) in 2007. The TWFD established the free flow for
television programs and it provided the introduction – only ‘where practicable’ – of
quotas for encouraging the production and distribution of European audiovisual
works (Iosifidis, 2011). In other terms, the TWFD was about establishing some
minimum common rules and liberalisation (Michalis, 2014). In addition, MEDIA
program – established in 1991 – became the key financial instrument in order to
support EU audiovisual industries. Today, MEDIA is a part of Creative Europe
Program and its annual budget is around 120 million EUR. Comparatively, in
2017, the total budget of French Film Centre (Centre national du cinema) reached
707 million EUR.
It is necessary to bear in mind that the EU policy tools in the audiovisual sector
have been built on the tension between market interest and public interest
(d’Haenens et al., 2018) and they have constantly struggled between two political
logics (Collins, 1994; Gibbons and Humphreys, 2012; Littoz-Monnet, 2007): on
the one hand, an interventionist policy model – defended by France, the European
film production industry, the Public Service Broadcasters and followed by several
countries, such as Spain, Italy, Belgium, Greece and often by the European
Parliament. This position highlights the importance of public policies – with finan-
cial aid, market regulation, intellectual property rights regulation, protection and
promotion of cultural diversity – in audiovisual industries and recognises the
specificit of cultural goods and services; on the other hand, an economic regulation
model, – defended mostly by private broadcasting lobby, the telecoms industry, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Luxembourg and other north-
ern European countries, as well as by the European Commission (hereafter
‘Commission’). This position considers audiovisual goods and services both as
industrial sector based on ‘free market’ norm and as policy area on which the
Commission should have reduced competency to intervene.
EU agenda on audiovisual services has been recently dominated by the 2007
AVMSD’s review (Vlassis, 2017). Here, the issue was twofold: prevent the
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establishment of formerly local and national standards in digital markets and
ensure open audiovisual markets to transnational digital content and/or establish
governance arrangements in the digital economy in order to involve large online
platforms in the financing, distribution and visibility of European audiovisual
content. The new text (Regulation (EU), 2018/1808) – approved by the
European Parliament in October 2018 – includes obligations for providers of
on-demand audiovisual services to respect a quota of 30% for European works
on their catalogues. Note that during the negotiations on the AVMSD review,
several EU Member States, such as France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Romania,
proposed the establishment of quota of 30–40% for European works, whereas
Finland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Czech Republic were against the
perspective of including quotas on the online platforms’ catalogues (New Europe,
2018).
In addition, the revised AVMSD includes derogation to the country of origin
principle. The latter, seen as cornerstone of European audiovisual policy, means
that service providers are only subject to the rules of their country of origin where
they are established. According to the revised AVMSD, where Member-States
require linear broadcaster and VOD provider, under their jurisdiction, to contrib-
ute financially to the production of European and national film content, they may
also require linear broadcaster and VOD provider, targeting audiences in their
territories, but established in other Member-States, to make such financial contri-
bution (but only in association with the turnover generated in the imposing
country).
It can be said that the revised text is based on a logic à la carte, which histor-
ically dominates EU intervention in audiovisual industries. It is indicative that in
2019, only France, Germany, Italy, Denmark and the Flemish Community of
Belgium have developed obligations for non-domestic providers of on-demand
audiovisual media services (Donders et al., 2018: 12).
Second, as for market profile, the EU regulatory policy-making seeks to deal
with three key trends in EU film market: (i) the survival of several national film
industries and the growth trend of European film production; (ii) the weakness of
preventing Hollywood domination in EU audiovisual market; (iii) a strongly frag-
mented distribution of European films in the internal market.
Tables 1 and 2 highlight that despite a delicate economic environment, EU film
production constantly continues to grow. In 2017, the film production almost
double compared to 2005 and three countries represent around 50% of EU film
production: France, Germany and Spain. At the same time, US films including
Table 1. EU film production (source: EAO).
2005 2008 2011 2013 2015 2017
Total feature films EU28 911a 1,140a 1,547 1,607 1,643 1,676
aEU27.
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those produced in Europe with incoming US investment achieved an estimated
market share of 70%. A closer analysis on the European Audiovisual Observatory
(EAO) data (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2008–2018)4 reveals three points:
the European market is characterised by an overwhelming share of Hollywood in
the majority of EU members and by an exceedingly small proportion of films from
other countries, whereas French film market is marked by a constant and dynamic
position of national films (Tables 3 and 4). Moreover, as EAO stressed
(Grece, 2016), film theatrical release constitutes key criterion for the film visibility
on on-demand services. In a digital world of abundance, theatrical release remains
a main way of promoting films.
According to available statistical data, in 2016 EU films travel less well on VOD
than US films: on average, EU films are available in 2.8 countries, US films in 6.8
countries. To this it should be added half of EU films are only available on VOD in
one country (Grece, 2016: 4). In 2018, European audiovisual content represents
26% of the available content on VOD services in the EU. British film and TV series
titles make up the bulk of EU exports in VOD platforms (Grece and Pumares,
2019). In this regard, while France is historically the leading producer of films in
Europe (300 films in 2018, including 118 co-productions), in 2017, only 1.9% of
Table 2. Film production in selected countries (source: EAO).
Feature films produced/year 2005 2008 2011 2013 2015 2017
France 240 240 271 269 300 300
Germany 146 185 205 236 236 247
Spain 142 173 200 235 254 247
Table 3. Market share in the EU film market (source: EAO).
Market share (in %)/year 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
European films 26.7 28.5 26.2 26.1 27.5
US 67.1 61.4 69.1 64 66.2
EU inc./US 4.2 8.4 1.1 7.3 3.7
Others 2.0 1.6 3.6 2.6 2.6
Table 4. National film market share (source: EAO).
National film market share (in %)/year 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
France 36.8 40.9 33.8 35.5 37.4
Germany 27.4 21.8 26.2 27.5 23.9
Spain 16 15 13.9 19.2 17.0
The Netherlands 17.3 22.4 20.5 18.7 12.0
Sweden 32.7 21.3 24.8 20.7 17.2
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films available on Netflix in Europe (except France) are French ones (Unifrance,
2018). In a similar vein, in 2018, the US-based companies Netflix and Amazon
Prime Video represent 74% of EU VOD revenues and 79% of EU VOD subscrib-
ers (Grece, 2019). Finally, in France, in 2018 the top-20 most-consumed content on
VOD platforms include only two non-US programs – the series La Casa de papel
and Black Mirror (Centre national du cinema, 2019: 188).
It is clear here that EU VOD market is characterised by an asymmetry favour-
ing US online platforms and US/anglophone content and a more exhaustive anal-
ysis based on consumed content on VOD platforms would not necessarily alter our
picture of the balance of power within the European audiovisual landscape.
EU in global audiovisual politics: El Secreto De Sus Ojos
The EU, as party to the CDCE, has the formal right to implement the CDCE in
the same way as the member-states. The ‘European Agenda for culture in a glob-
alizing world’, launched by the Commission in 2006 and adopted in 2007 is the first
policy framework for culture at EU level. It recognises the EU as a cultural actor in
external relations and it claims a leading role for the EU with respect to the
CDCE’s norms. In 2017, the EU Council adopted the ‘Conclusions on an EU
strategic approach to international cultural relations’ making the promotion of
the diversity of cultural expressions a guiding principle in EU external action.
As a result, since 2007, several EU initiatives showed that the EU seeks to promote
cultural norms as part of its international economic and cultural relations. It is worth
mentioning four types of action: (i) in 2010, UNESCO and the Commission created
an expert facility project, funded by the EU in order to implement the CDCE through
the strengthening of the system of governance for cultural and audiovisual industries
in developing countries; (ii) the inclusion of a ‘Protocol on cultural cooperation’ in the
trade agreements with CARRIFORUM (2008), South Korea (2010) and Central
America (2012); (iii) the incorporation of explicit references to the CDCE in the
agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and in the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between EU and Canada; (iv) the
protection – such as in the T-TIP negotiations between EU and US – of the capacity
of the Union and its Member-States to implement cultural and audiovisual policies,
taking account of developments in the digital environment.
However, the EU strategy has changed in the recent EU trade agreements with
Vietnam, Japan and Singapore, finalised between 2016 and 2018. On the one hand,
the agreements contain a ‘cultural exception’ dealing with audiovisual services and
incorporated in the Chapter 8 of the agreements devoted to ‘Trade in Services,
Investment and E-Commerce’. On the other hand, no reference to the CDCE
appears in the three agreements and no Protocol on Cultural Cooperation is
included. A first reason for this change is related to the international commitments
of Japan and Singapore. None of two countries are Parties to the CDCE, while
Vietnam ratified the CDCE in 2007. In fact, a more nuanced analysis could lead us
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to two additional factors, which weaken the EU action in global politics for
culture.
First, the recent EU initiatives lack social support. As demonstrated by several
studies (Loisen and De Ville, 2011; Garner, 2017; Vlassis, 2016a), he mentioned
initiatives illustrate a top-down approach without clear links to the European
organisations of cultural professionals. The top-down building of the Protocols
on Cultural Cooperation – based on Commission’s initiative – hinders effective
implementation of their provisions, leaving aside the main actors of the implemen-
tation, such as EU national governments and EU culture organisations (European
Centre for Development Policy Management, 2011; European Commission, 2014).
Second, the balance between intergovernmentalism method and Community
action leads to another factor (Ang et al. 2015; Vlassis, 2016a). Clearly, the rela-
tionship between Commision and several national governments, such as French
authorities, is based on a constant suspision related to the treatment of cultural
goods and services in trade agreements. During the negotiations on T-TIP, the
Commission sought to include the digital cultural services in the EU mandate of
negotiations, questioning explicitly the ‘cultural exception’ norm. Even Jose
Manuel Barroso, president of the Commission, characterised cultural exception
as a ‘reactionary and harmful position’ (Le Monde, 2013). Moreover, the Protocol
on Cultural Cooperation with South Korea was strongly criticised by French gov-
ernment. The latter denounced that the Commission intended to include the cul-
tural and audiovisual industries within the agenda of negotiations in order to use
them as a selling point for proceeding with trade deals and gain concessions in
other economic areas (Vlassis, 2016a).
It is revealing that in 2017, under the instigation of France and Canada, the
Parties to the CDCE adopted Operational Guidelines in order to align the CDCE
with the development of digital technologies. Even though the EU is Party to the
Convention, it did not participate in the UNESCO debates on the operational
guidelines as a single entity due to lack of common European position on the
link between cultural industries and digital technologies.
EU in the global film market: For a few dollars more
Despite these several developments, the balance of power within the global film
market is constantly characterised by a strong asymmetry in favour of the United
States. In other terms, EU could not be regarded as a global or even regional
power in global film market. The European film market is still an integrated fea-
ture of the US economy. Inspired by the world system theory of the French his-
torian Fernand Braudel, the economist Charles-Albert Michalet pointed out that
since 1980s, Hollywood has developed the ‘world-cinema’ (cinema-monde) strategy
based on three key mechanisms: (i) the development of world movie, both an event
and a global film; (ii) the development of a global approach on the market; (iii) the
establishment of a horizontal cooperation among companies centred on entertain-
ment activities. ‘The world cinema reflects the economic forces that showed up the
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global capitalism, namely an economic system that can only be operating in a
global dimension’ (Michalet, 1987: 112).
The fact of Hollywood’s domination of global trade in motion pictures is well
established (Miller et al., 2005; Scott, 2005) and the following comparative data
add further gloss on the worldwide market power of Hollywood. Despite norma-
tive developments about film industry previously mentioned, during the period
2012–2018, the 15 highest film successes, distributed by Hollywood studios, repre-
sent about a third of annual worldwide cinema revenues: in 2012, they accumulate
about 34% of revenue in the global marketplace, 32% in 2013, 30% in 2014, 37%
in 2015, 32% in 2016, 34% in 2017 and 33% in 2018. An additional point is that in
2013, 2015 and 2017, the 15 highest movie successes, distributed by Hollywood,
recorded more than half of their revenues within ‘international’ cinema markets –
outside the United States and Canada.5
Moreover, the Hollywood majors have a strong capacity of strategic adaptation
to new technological forces. This claim is confirmed by three recent economic
alliances: first, the acquisition by the telecommunication company AT&T of enter-
tainment conglomerate Time Warner – including film studio Warner Bros. and
cable–satellite television network HBO; second, the acquisition by the Walt Disney
Company of the film studio 20th Century Fox and of the VOD service Hulu. Main
result of these acquisitions is the launch of two new global VOD platforms: HBO
Max and Disneyþ. Third, in January 2019, Netflix became the first internet com-
pany–VOD platform to join the ranks of Motion Pictures Association of America,
granting membership to the trade association.
Furthermore, despite the spread of ‘cultural exception’ norm in the 1990s and
the dynamic implementation of CDCE since 2005, Hollywood film, enjoying major
technological developments, has remained a key content for several media plat-
forms (DVD, TV and VOD). The comparative data between US, Chinese, Indian
and EU movies presented in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate that Hollywood movies
are still the only global audiovisual content.
First, the Chinese film market is characterised by impressive growth. In 2004,
total film market revenues represent 435 million USD. By contrast, in 2019,
Chinese film market is one of the ‘few large enough to compete with that of the
United States’ (Overpeck, 2018: 27), generating 9.2 billion USD in box-office rev-
enue – 20 times higher than 15 years ago. Due to strict regulatory mechanisms –
high quotas for national content, distribution restrictions, censorship (Su, 2016;
Vlassis, 2016b) –, Chinese film keeps achieving an estimated national market share
of 50%. Yet, Chinese films are particularly made in order to satisfy the impressive
expansion of national film market, whereas Chinese cinema is not on the point of
breaking out beyond its established market sphere. As such, Chinese movies
achieve extremely poor results in a few film markets and they are not on release
in the majority of countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America (Table 6).
Second, Tables 5 and 8 reveal the overwhelming gap between Hollywood
movies and Indian cinema in international markets, as well as the weakness of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the domestic market and only few number of movies achieve good results in
other national film markets, especially in China.
Third, Table 7 on the Top 16 EU movies – UK movies included – worldwide
reveals that European audiovisual industry is on the point of making some films
with high production values and a relatively appeal to global audiences, having the
ability to penetrate well beyond its usual range of trade. However, three important
findings should be highlighted here: (i) except La Vità e bella, all the movies are
produced in France, Germany and in the UK; (ii) except Intouchables and La Vità
e bella, all these movies are anglophone and (iii) 7 out of 16 movies movies are
produced by the same French producer and film-maker, Luc Besson, who since
1990s has moved ‘towards popular genres and narratives previously considered the
domain of Hollywood’ (Bergfelder, 2005: 318).
In this view, it can be said that there is still a small number of centres of motion
picture production around the world, such as EU, India, China–Hong Kong,
South Korea or Japan, that maintain high levels of output in terms of films
made by year. Simultaneously, financial and regulatory measures for film sector
succeed to maintain and to promote a thriving national film industry such as in
France, South Korea or China (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2008–2018).
However, all these alternative sites of film production fail to challenge the domi-
nance of Hollywood in terms of global visibility, unparalleled marketing capacity
and worldwide distribution (Crane, 2014; Vlassis, 2016b). As such, the compara-
tive statistical data presented here highlight the unprecedented capacity of
Hollywood in terms of worldwide film distribution. Indeed, the ‘world-cinema’
strategy contributes to increase the imbalance within global film market and to
establish Hollywood’s domination in two directions: it is used for limiting the
access to the US market for foreign movies, which do not enjoy major financial
and marketing resources; on the other side of the coin, following the same logic,
the ‘world-cinema’ mechanisms grant the advantage to Hollywood movies in the
global trade in motion pictures entailing progressive economic integration of
national film markets and convergence of audience’s time and preferences
(Vlassis, 2016b).
These remarks lead the discussion directly to the fact that the launch of disrup-
tive US VOD services – such as Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, HBO Max, Apple
TV Plus or Disneyþ – and the attempted export of these services to global markets
(Jin Dal, 2017; Lobato, 2018) follow the mechanics of ‘world-cinema’. These online
platforms have unequalled capacities to disseminate audiovisual content on a
global scale and exercise strong influence over whether and how audiovisual con-
tent can be accessed, even though these VOD services are expected to have ‘dif-
ferentiated effects on the markets’ they have entered (Lobato, 2018: 184). Today
the only worldwide VOD services are US-based companies, such as Netflix and
Amazon Prime Video – and by end 2020 we should add HBO Max, Disneyþ and
Apple TV Plus: Netflix, the world’s largest subscription VOD service, is available
worldwide except mainland China, Syria, North Korea. As of February 2020,
Netflix has around 170 million total subscribers worldwide and it spent around
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12 and 15 billion USD on original content in 2018 and 2019, respectively. For its
part, Amazon Prime Video has around 100 million subscribers and it launched
worldwide in December 2016 except for mainland China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea
and Syria.
Here, the case of China is representative about potential change of audiovisual
content flow due to the trend of platformisation. As of February 2020, Netflix,
Amazon Prime Video and other foreign VOD services are blocked for operating in
mainland China under Internet censorship policy, leaving plenty of room for
encouraging national private investment and strengthening Chinese VOD services.
The three Chinese Internet giants Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (collectively known
as BAT) have been expanding in the entertainment sector (Meng, 2018: 95), setting
up VOD platforms. In this respect, foreign streaming giants are missing out and
China’s fast-growing VOD market6 is currently dominated by three platforms
operated by BAT – Baidu’s iQiyi, Alibaba’s Youku and Tencent’s Tencent
Video. Chinese authorities restrict national VOD companies to ensure that no
more than 30% of their content emanates from overseas. Search for US audiovi-
sual content was a direct effect of banning foreign VOD services and in this regard,
content licensing deals have strongly been multiplied:
(i) in September 2013, Tencent Video signed a deal with Disney Media
Distribution to bring a collection of Disney, Pixar and Marvel Studios titles
to the company’s streaming movie service;
(ii) Tencent became in November 2014 the HBO’s exclusive online partner in
China;
(iii) in September 2015, Paramount Pictures signed content licencing deal with
Youku, the Alibaba’s video streaming player, for more than 100 titles from
the Paramount film library;
(iv) Warner Bros signed a deal to supply movies to iQiyi in March 2017;
(v) Netflix introduce original content in China via a licensing deal signed in April
2017 with iQiyi;
(vi) in December 2017, Youku signed content licencing deal with NBCUniversal
and Sony Pictures Television.
Indeed, the dominance of BAT in the national VOD market is strongly based on
strict regulation from Chinese authorities, which ban the activities of foreign
streaming giants. In other terms, VOD market seems to be a mirror of the
Chinese film market: impressive domestic expansion of the VOD market; encour-
agement of national private investment; strong presence of Chinese and US audio-
visual content. By contrast, the activities of the three Chinese VOD platforms are
poor beyond the mainland China. As stated by Y. Weidong, president of Youku,
‘by cooperating with NBCUniversal and Sony Pictures Television to show famous
Hollywood films on our platform, we can bring richer global content into
Alibaba’s entertainment ecosystem’ (South China Morning Post, 2017).
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Lastly, with these remarks in mind, it has to be said that since the arrival of
Trump administration, the US trade diplomacy become more transactional, uni-
lateral and offensive in its use of trade defence instruments. The new US priorities
could have an impact on worldwide audiovisual content flow, insofar as over the
last 30 years, US FTAs have been a key tool for eliminating foreign trade barriers
in audiovisual content flows. It is revealing that China and the US are currently
negotiating an eight-year old agreement dealing with film industry. The negotia-
tions were initially planned to be concluded by the end of 2017. That did not
happen due to Trump administration’s decisions to impose tariffs on several
Chinese goods and services.
Concluding remarks
The article has offered a first multi-dimensional investigation in order to highlight
the EU influence in global audiovisual politics and economy, paying special atten-
tion to the nexus between ‘audiovisual industry and online platforms’ and analy-
sing whether the EU practices are translated into impact in the global film
economy. As such, by exploring the continuity in a context of major technological
developments, the article provided a deeper understanding of the balance of power
and its transformations in the global audiovisual politics and economy. The pic-
ture that emerges sheds light on seven key points:
First, global audiovisual politics are based on a normative dichotomy between
‘free trade’ norm, which favours the breaking down of regulatory and financial
measures in the audiovisual sector as prominent conditions of development for this
industry on one side, and on the other side, the ‘cultural exception’ norm, which
recognises the importance of cultural policies and the specificity of cultural goods
and services. This dichotomy has been established beyond international political
cleavages, such as North/South divide or West/the Rest. Today, the context of
platformisation intensifies the existing political debate, insofar as online platforms
offer innovative ways of providing audiovisual content over electronic networks,
challenging strongly the ‘cultural exception’ norm.
Second, the major issue in the EU is related to the regulation of the digital
audiovisual economy in order to involve the large online platforms in the financ-
ing, distribution and visibility of European audiovisual content. Indeed, the
adopted measures follow path-dependence logic from the analogue–broadcast
era to the digital one. On the one hand, the EU response is based on a logic à
la carte, which historically dominates the EU governance in audiovisual industries.
On the other hand, today several EU member states are seeking to re-balance the
rules of audiovisual ecosystem between traditional players in the sector, such as TV
channels and cinema theatres, subject to several obligations and new digital play-
ers, such as online platforms. There is also strong possibility that some EU
member-states could pursue their efforts, aiming to establish more ambitious
audiovisual legislations in terms of obligations for online platforms and to pro-
mote actively their cultural sovereignty online.
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Third, since the CDCE adoption, the EU has sought to include the diversity of
cultural expressions among its priorities, especially using trade agreements as main
way to transpose cultural norms. As such, despite some political divisions, EU
seeks to promote ‘cultural exception’ norm in trade agreements, taking account of
developments in the digital environment. However, EU initiatives in promoting
cultural norms to global governance of trade and investment face both lack of
social support from organisations of cultural professionals and reluctance of
member states with strong interests in cultural affairs.
Fourth, despite these policy developments, Hollywood majors continue to play
a dominant role in global audiovisual economy and EU is not still regarded as a
global or even regional power in global trade in motion pictures. That being said,
even though financial and regulatory measures represent forms of surviving and
maintaining a national cinematography such as the cases of France or South
Korea, they fail to challenge the Hollywood’s domination in terms of marketing
capacity and worldwide distribution.
Fifth, small wonder, then, that the powerful US VOD services – engaged in
internationalising their activities and building synergistic strategies – follow the
‘world-cinema’ strategy. Despite their competition with each other, US online
platforms – such as Netflix, HBO Max, Disneyþ, Amazon Prime Video and
Apple TV Plus – are connected by common audiovisual language and strong
strategic interdependence, benefitting from large domestic base of consumers,
economies of scale, popularity of English speech and capacity of producing in
multiple languages. In the light of this situation, US platforms also contribute
to the progressive economic integration of national audiovisual markets and to
the dynamic convergence of audience’s time and preferences. As such, the recent
activities of US online platforms and the alliances between large online platforms
and Hollywood majors endow the US audiovisual industry with further compet-
itive capacities in its long-term ascendancy on world audiovisual content flows.
Sixth, the controversial discussions around ‘cultural exception’ and ‘diversity of
cultural expressions’ showed that the US have no longer the uncontested norma-
tive and moral leadership (Tunstall 2008) in global audiovisual politics. Besides,
online platforms have not resolved political tensions but they seem to intensify
existing political dichotomies. Today, there is possibility of stricter regulation and
higher quotas online, notably in some EU member-states. However, recent regu-
latory developments have not significantly altered the balance of power in global
audiovisual landscape and the arrival of powerful US VOD platforms largely
strengthens the remarkable durability of Hollywood/US content as central point
of reference in the global audiovisual economy.
Finally, the US unilateral trade diplomacy could have an impact on global
audiovisual economy. It is rather complex to assess today the effects of the
rising trade conflicts on worldwide audiovisual and film flows. But, there is
strong possibility to lead to more ethnocentric and closed audiovisual markets
slowing down the worldwide expansion of US audiovisual content rather than
to the rise of global challengers to US audiovisual dominance.
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Notes
1. The statistical data presented in the article come from European Audiovisual
Observatory, Box Office Mojo, IMDb, Centre national du Cinema (CNC-France),
Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA).
2. Australia, Bahrein, Chile, Colombia, Costa-Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, Salvador, Singapore,
South Korea.
3. Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, US and Vietnam.
4. Our conclusions are based on the statistical data from European Audiovisual
Observatory. See also Tables 1–4. https://www.obs.coe.int/en/web/observatoire/.
5. Author’s research results based on MPAA and Mojo statistical data.
6. According to Statista, revenue in the Chinese VOD market amounts to 1.73 billion USD
in 2018 compared to 0.93 billion USD in 2016. https://www.statista.com/outlook/201/
117/video-on-demand/china.
7. Available comparative statistical data only regarding these 11 Chinese movies.
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